Longitudinal study of the use of client-side security mechanisms on the European web by Chen, Ping et al.
Longitudinal Study of the Use of Client-side Security
Mechanisms on the European Web
Ping Chen†, Lieven Desmet†, Christophe Huygens†, Wouter Joosen†
†iMinds-DistriNet, KU Leuven, 3001 Leuven, Belgium
†{firstname.lastname}@cs.kuleuven.be
ABSTRACT
As the web rapidly expands and gets integrated into all kinds
of business, browsing the web has become an important part
of people’s daily lives. With the rising importance of various
web applications sit in a browser, attackers also shifted their
focus towards client-side attacks. To defend against these
attacks, numerous client-side security mechanisms for the
browser are proposed. The presence of these mechanisms
on a website can be used as an indicator of the security
awareness and practices of that website.
In this paper, through a large-scale analysis of more than
18,000 European websites over two years, we analyze the
longitudinal trends of the adoption of client-side security
mechanisms. We validate that the most popular websites
were adopting new security features quicker that less popu-
lar websites in the two year timeframe. By examining the
websites based on their business vertical, we observe that
the websites in the Finance and Education category are out-
performing other verticals in the data set, with respect to
the usage of client-side security mechanisms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The web is constantly evolving, with new technologies
such as HTML5 and CSS3 getting widely used and sup-
ported, which provide internet users richer experience. In
the mean time, the attacks on the web are also changing,
shifting from server exploitation such as SQL injection to
client-side attacks such as XSS and Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)
attacks such as SSL-stripping. In respond to this trend, var-
ious client-side security mechanisms are developed, such as
Content Security Policy (CSP) and HTTP Strict-Transport-
Security (HSTS). These client-side security mechanisms are
sever-driven, but requires the browser to enforce them. The
presence of these mechanisms on a website can be used as
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an indicator of the security awareness and practices of that
website.
This paper tries to give an overview of the adoption of
client-side security mechanisms on the web, and provide a
state-of-practice reference model of web security for website
operators. To achieve this, we crawled more than 18,000
European websites in a two-year period. With the gathered
data, we analyze the evolution of the usage of client-side
security mechanisms, and use a security scoring system to
compare a website to its peers (based on business vertical or
popularity), in order to provide a web security baseline for
website operators.
Our main contributions are the following: (1) We report
the usage of seven client-side security mechanisms on Eu-
ropean web in September 2013 and September 2015, and
analyze the evolution of adoption (i.e., identify which secu-
rity features are being adopted over time); (2) We propose a
web security scoring system to compare the security posture
(i.e., the practice of the usage of client-side security features)
among different websites, and among countries, business sec-
tors; (3) We provide a web security baseline and maturity
model for website operators, by applying the web security
scoring system to a set of websites.
2. DATA COLLECTION
To study the security posture of the European web, the
popular websites from the 28 member states in the EU are
chosen to represent the European web. For each EU coun-
try, we selected the top 1,000 websites ending with the cor-
responding ccTLD (country code top-level domain) from
Alexa’s list of the top 1 million sites [1]1. As a result, we
have a set of 23,050 European websites.
We then obtained up to 200 webpage URLs for each web-
site by querying the Bing search engine [2] for the popular
webpages of each website. After the webpage URLs are ob-
tained, PhantomJS, a headless browser, is used to visit the
URLs and retrieve data from webpages. By loading every
webpage within PhantomJS [4], we mimicked the behavior
of a regular visitor using a Chrome browser.
After we have crawled all the URLs, we remove the web-
sites with less than 50 successfully crawled pages from our
dataset. Then we have a dataset of 20,157 websites in 2013,
and a dataset of 18,074 websites in 2015, as shown in Ta-
ble 1. The 2015 dataset is smaller than 2013 dataset, which
is due to that some domains are disappeared or redirected
to other domains.
1Alexa top 1 million list in September 2013
Time # of sites # of pages avg. # of pages/site
Sept. 2013 20,147 3,499,080 174
Sept. 2015 18,074 2,992,395 166
Table 1: Overview of datasets
3. SECURITY FEATURES AND SCORING
SYSTEM
3.1 Security features
In this study, we focus on seven security features that
can all be passively detected. We grouped them into three
categories:
• 3 features that contribute to Secure Communica-
tion
• 3 features that mitigate Cross-Site Scripting
• 1 feature that enables Secure Framing
3.1.1 Category 1: Secure Communication
The Secure Communication category groups three secu-
rity features: HTTPS support, Secure Cookies, and HTTP
Strict Transport Security (HSTS).
HTTPS Support. The HTTPS protocol is the standard
solution for securing web traffic, which guarantees the
confidentiality and integrity of web communications by
adding the security capabilities of SSL/TLS to HTTP.
It also provides website authenticity with the CA/B
(Certificate Authority/Browser) trust model.
Secure Cookies. HTTPS websites should set the Secure
attribute when sending cookies to a user’s browser,
which can prevent cookies from being intercepted by an
active network attacker. Although the traffic between
a web server and a browser is encrypted when using
HTTPS, the cookies stored in the browser are not, by
default, limited to an HTTPS context. Thus an active
network attacker can intercept any outbound HTTP
request from the browser and redirect that request to
the same website over HTTP in order to reveal the
cookies [5]. By setting the Secure attribute, the scope
of a cookie is limited to secure channels, thus stop-
ping browsers from sending cookies over unencrypted
HTTP requests.
HTTP Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS). HSTS [6] is
designed to mainly prevent SSL-stripping attacks where
a secure HTTPS connection is downgraded to a plain
HTTP connection by the attacker. Set by a website
via a HTTP response header field (Strict-Transport-
Security), HSTS specifies a period of time during
which the user’s browser is instructed that all requests
to that website need to be sent over HTTPS, regard-
less of what a user requests. The HSTS Policy helps
protecting website users against both passive eaves-
dropping, as well as active Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
attacks [7].
3.1.2 Category 2: XSS Mitigation
The XSS Mitigation category groups three security fea-
tures: HTTPOnly Cookies, X-Content-Type-Options (XCTO),
and Content Security Policy (CSP).
HttpOnly Cookies. First introduced in Internet Explorer
(IE) 6 SP1, the HttpOnly attribute is designed to mit-
igate the risk of malicious client-side scripts access-
ing sensitive cookie values. Cookies are accessible to
JavaScript code by default, which allows attackers to
steal the cookies via an XSS attack. Using the HttpOnly
attribute in a Set-Cookie header restrict the access of
that cookie to the HTTP(S) protocol, making it inac-
cessible to client-side JavaScript [5].
X-Content-Type-Options (XCTO). Internet Explorer has
a MIME-sniffing feature that will attempt to determine
the content type for each downloaded resource. This
feature, however, can lead to security problems for
servers hosting untrusted content. To prevent Internet
Explorer from MIME-sniffing, thus reducing exposure
to attacks, a web server can send the X-Content-Type-
Options response header with the nosniff value.
Content Security Policy (CSP). CSP provides a stan-
dard HTTP response header (Content-Security-Policy)
that allows a webpage to declare approved sources of
content that browsers should be allowed to load on that
specific page. Whenever a requested resource origi-
nates from a source that is not defined in the CSP, it
will simply not be loaded [10]. For example, if the pol-
icy does not allow in-line JavaScript, then, even if an
attacker is able to inject malicious JavaScript in the
webpage, the injected code will not be executed.
3.1.3 Category 3: Secure Framing
The Secure Framing category reports on the use of X-
Frame-Options (XFO).
X-Frame-Options (XFO). The HTTP response header
X-Frame-Options is designed to mitigate Clickjacking
attacks [8]. In a Clickjacking attack, the attacker re-
dresses the user interface of website A with transpar-
ent layers, and then trick the user into clicking on a
button on an embed page from website B when they
were intending to click on the the same place of the
overlaying page from website A. To stop Clickjacking
attacks, the X-Frame-Options header can be used to
instruct a user’s browser whether a certain page is al-
lowed to be embedded in a frame. For example, if
the X-Frame-Options header’s value is DENY, then the
browser will prevent the page from rendering when em-
bedded within a frame.
3.2 Web Security Scoring System
In order to compare the security level among different
websites, and among countries, business verticals (repre-
sented by the websites in each country or business verti-
cal), we developed a web security scoring system that gives
a quantitative security score for each website.
For each (group of) website(s), we define the overall se-














As part of of scoring system, we assess for each security
feature how well the (group of) website(s) is doing compared
to websites in the full dataset. For instance, we want to
grade a website with a score 0.61 to the feature HTTPS, if
the website outperforms 61% of the websites in our dataset
(i.e. by having a higher percentage of pages over HTTPS).
The scores of the individual features are then combined to
provide a metric for the three subscores.
More concretely, we apply the following approach:
1. For each security feature, we compute an empirical cu-
mulative function (ECDF) for all websites. The ECDF
is computed based on the percentage of webpages hav-
ing that feature on a particular website.
2. This computed ECDF is used to calculate an ECDF
value per website and per feature.
3. The subscores are calculated by applying a weighted
averages of the ECDF values.
The weight given for each feature reflect the relative im-
portance and maturity of the feature in each category. The
more fundamental and matured feature get a relatively higher
weights. In particular, the following weights are used to cal-
culated the three subscores:
Secure Communication Score. This subscore is mea-
sured by applying a weighted average of the HTTPS,













XSS Mitigation Score. This subscore measured by ap-
plying a weighted average of the HttpOnly Cookies,




















4.1 Overview on the use of security features
on European web
Table 2 gives an overview on the use of security features
on European web in 2013 and 2015. It clearly illustrates
that the web security on the European Web did improve, as
each of the security features have been adopted in 2015 by




Sept. 2013 Sept. 2015
HTTPS Support 22.96% 32.40% 9.44%
Secure Cookies 5.86% 7.56% 1.70%
HSTS 0.49% 4.30% 3.81%
HttpOnly Cookies 36.52% 43.86% 7.34%
XCTO 2.24% 6.82% 4.58%
CSP 0.05% 0.43% 0.38%
XFO 4.80% 14.93% 10.13%
Table 2: Overview of the use of security features on Euro-
pean web
The above table gives an overview for the whole European
Web. We also assess to what extent the security of a partic-
ular website did improve over time, by measuring for each
website if it adopts more security features over time or not.
Since none of the websites have all seven security features
enabled in 2013, there is space for improvement for all the
websites.
By doing this, we found 6,512 (36%) websites that adopted
more security features in 2015 than what they already have
in 2013. And there are 22 websites that have all seven secu-
rity features adopted in 2015.
4.2 Websites that adopted more security fea-
tures
In this section, we investigate the relationship between
the adoption of security features on a website and its pop-
ularity (measured by its Alexa global rank [1]), its sector
(derived from McAfee’s TrustedSource Web Database [3]).
We expect that higher ranked popular website and websites
belonging to critical sectors such as finance and online shop-
ping, might have more incentive to adopt security features
in order to protect their asset, compared to the less-known
or less-valuable websites.
To confirm this hypothesis, we first use Point-biserial cor-
relation to study the correlation between the adoption of
security features in a website and its Alexa rank. Generally,
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (Pearson’s
r) is widely used in statistics as a measure of the degree of lin-
ear dependence between two quantitative variables. In our
case, the adoption of security feature is a binary choice, thus
we use the Point-biserial correlation coefficient. The Point-
biserial correlation coefficient is a special case of Pearson in
which one variable is quantitative and the other variable is
dichotomous. The result of Point-biserial correlation varies
between −1 and +1, and a positive coefficient implies that as
one variable increases, the other variable also increases and
vice versa. When using Point-biserial correlation to test sta-
tistical dependence, we set the significance level to 5%. The
p-value is calculated using Student’s t-distribution. We ac-
cept the hypothesis only if the p-value is smaller than the
significance level.
Figure 1: The percentage of websites that adopted more
security features in 2015 versus 2013, plotted per 10k Alexa
ranks
The resulting Point-biserial correlation coefficient is -0.08,
with p-value 6.24× 10−29, which indicates a negative corre-
lation, hence it confirms our hypothesis that higher ranked
websites tend to adopt more security features. To better
illustrate this correlation, for per 10,000 Alexa ranks, we
calculate the percentage of websites that belongs to that
rank range, which have adopted more security features, as
shown in Figure 1. We can observe a downtrend for the per-
centage of websites that adopted more security features over
the Alexa ranks.
As for the relationship between the adoption of security
features in a website and its sector, we calculate the percent-
age of websites that adopted more security features in each
sector. Figure 2 shows the top 10 sectors that have larger
percentage of websites adopted more security features over
time. It comes as no surprise that the Finance vertical is
the best performing category. And among the 22 websites
that have all seven security features enabled in 2015, half of
them (11 websites) are from the Finance sector.
Figure 2: The percentage of websites that adopted more
security features in 2015 versus 2013, grouped per business
vertical
5. WEB SECURITY SCORE ANALYSIS
In the previous section, we assess to what extent the secu-
rity of a particular website did improve over time, by mea-
suring for each website if it adopts more security features
over time or not. In this section, we investigate how consis-
tently a security features is applied on a given website, by
Correlation 2013 Dataset Correlation 2015 Dataset
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
−0.11 1.81× 10−59 −0.08 3.84× 10−31
Table 3: Correlation between the OverallScore in a website
and its Alexa rank
calculating ECDF-based security scores (as explained in Sec-
tion 3.2), which essentially compare the usage of a security
feature on a particular website with the usage on other web-
sites in the dataset.
5.1 EU Web Security Score, in terms of web-
site popularity
To assess the web security score in terms of website popu-
larity, the websites are grouped per 10,000 Alexa ranks, and
the average score is calculated for websites that belongs to
that rank range. Figure 3 shows the average OverallScore
for per 10k Alexa ranks.
Figure 3: The average OverallScore for per 10k Alexa ranks
Figure 3 hints that higher ranked websites tend to have
higher score. To confirm this assumption, the Spearman
correlation is used to assert the correlation between the
OverallScore in a website and its Alexa rank for the 2013
dataset and 2015 dataset (as listed in Table 3).
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is a nonparamet-
ric measure of the monotonicity of the relationship between
two variables. It is defined as the Pearson correlation co-
efficient between the ranked variables. However, unlike the
Pearson correlation, the Spearman correlation does not as-
sume that both variables are normally distributed. It is a
nonparametric statistic, which do not rely on assumptions
that the dataset is drawn from a given probability distri-
bution. The result of Spearman correlation varies between
−1 and +1, and a positive coefficient implies that as one
variable increases, the other variable also increases and vice
versa. When using Spearman correlation to test statistical
dependence, we set the significance level to 5%. The p-value
is calculated using Student’s t-distribution. We accept the
hypothesis only if the p-value is smaller than the significance
level.
As expected from Figure 3, there is negative correlation
between the OverallScore in a website and its Alexa rank
(see Table 3), and this correlation also holds for all three sub
scores. This correlation is consistent with the correlation
that higher ranked websites tend to adopt more security
features, as we found in the previous section.
5.2 Web Security Score per business vertical
in EU
In this section, we compare the security evolution of the
websites per business vertical. For the ten most popular
business vertical, the average score is calculated for websites
that belongs to that business vertical. Figure 4 shows the
average OverallScore for 10 business verticals, sorted by
their 2013 security score, to easily identify business verticals
that got better than their adjacent peers.
Figure 4: The average OverallScore for each business ver-
tical
The Education and Finance verticals are the two best per-
forming categories in each of the subscores and the Overall
score. In addition, we can observe that the Business, Shop-
ping, and Marketing sectors improved a lot and eventually
caught up their neighbors.
5.3 Web Security Score per country in EU
In this section, we compare the security evolution of the
websites per country. For each EU country, the average score
is calculated for websites that belongs to that country. Fig-
ure 5 shows the average OverallScore for 25 EU countries.
Cyprus(.cy), Malta(.mt) and Luxemburg(.lu) were removed
from the dataset, as the number of websites in these coun-
tries were less than 100. The countries in Figure 5 are sorted
by their 2013 security score, to easily identify countries that
got better than their adjacent peers.
Figure 5: The average OverallScore for each country
6. HTTPS MIGRATION ANALYSIS
HTTPS in the standard solution for securing web traffic
nowadays, though it increases performance overhead and op-
erating costs. Among the 6,512 websites that adopted more
security features, 2,383 of them adopted HTTPS. We call
these websites the newly adopted HTTPS sites.
Figure 6 shows the top 10 sectors that have the most per-
centage of websites with HTTPS support. We can see that
Finance and Gambling are the best two verticals in 2013,
but Gambling was caught up by Gov./Mil. and Education
in 2015.
Figure 6: The average OverallScore for each business ver-
tical
While HTTPS already provides securing communication,
it would be better to also implements HSTS and Secure Cook-
ies to have stronger protection against MITM attacks. In
this section, we also investigate whether the newly adopted
HTTPS sites also implement HSTS and Secure Cookies,
when migrating to HTTPS.
As shown in Table 4, only 7.7% of newly adopted HTTPS
sites have HSTS implemented, which is less than the overall
percentage (11.5% of all HTTPS sites in 2015). And the use
of Secure Cookies in newly adopted HTTPS sites is also less
than the overall percentage. This indicates that the newly
adopted HTTPS sites are not more security conscious than
the websites having HTTPS already for a longer period. In
other words, the adoption of HTTPS does not necessary lead
to the adoption of Secure Cookies and HSTS.
HTTPS sites Newly adopted
in 2015 HTTPS sites
HSTS 11.5% 7.7%
Secure Cookies 22.8% 11.2%
Table 4: The use of HSTS and Secure Cookies in HTTPS
websites
7. RELATEDWORK
Client-side web security is becoming increasing important
nowadays. In [9], De Ryck et al. discussed various client-side
vulnerabilities and attacks, and enumerated best practices
for web security with existing countermeasures and emerg-
ing mitigation techniques. Weissbacher et al. [12] addressed
client-side validation (CSV) vulnerability and proposed a
system (ZigZag) to strengthen JavaScript-based web appli-
cations against client-side validation attacks.
This paper is built upon one of our previous works by
Van Goethem et al [11], in which the authors conducted a
security assessment for more than 22,000 European websites
in 2013, showing that such a large-scale security analysis of
the web is achievable, albeit challenging.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have compared the security state of
practice in the European Web, both in September 2013 and
September 2015. To do so, we crawled about 3 million web
pages of 18,000 websites. Based on analysis of available data
of the crawling experiment, we could observe the following
longitudinal trends:
First, we have observed that the most popular websites
(according to the Alexa ranking) have a higher web secu-
rity metric that less popular websites. Moreover, we could
validate that the most popular websites were adopting new
security features quicker that less popular websites in the
two year timeframe.
Second, by examining the websites based on their business
vertical, we can state that the websites in the Finance and
Education category are outperforming other verticals in the
data set, with respect to the web security metric.
We also proposed a web security scoring system to com-
pare different websites. The scoring system can be used to
establish a web security baseline among a set of websites,
and this might help website operators to consider the adop-
tion of security features.
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